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This paper derives empirically implementable formulas for the incidence and efficiency costs of taxation
that account for tax salience effects as well as other optimization errors. Contrary to conventional wisdom,
the formulas imply that the economic incidence of a tax depends on its statutory incidence and that
a tax can create deadweight loss even if it induces no change in demand.  The results are derived using
simple supply and demand diagrams and familiar notions of consumer and producer surplus. The approach
to welfare analysis proposed here yields robust formulas because it does not require specification of







chetty@econ.berkeley.eduA central assumption in public economics is that agents optimize fully with respect to
tax policies. For example, Frank P. Ramsey￿ s (1927) seminal analysis of optimal commodity
taxation assumes that agents respond to tax changes in the same way as price changes.
Canonical results on tax incidence, e¢ ciency costs, and optimal income taxation (e.g. Arnold
C. Harberger 1964, James A. Mirrlees 1971, Anthony B. Atkinson and Joseph E. Stiglitz
1976) all rely on full optimization with respect to taxes.
Contrary to the full optimization assumption, there is accumulating evidence which sug-
gests that individuals optimize imperfectly with respect to many types of tax and transfer
policies. For example, Raj Chetty, Adam Looney, and Kory Kroft (2007) analyze the e⁄ect
of ￿salience￿on behavioral responses to commodity taxation. They ￿nd that commodity
taxes that are included in the posted prices that consumers see when shopping (and are thus
more salient) have much larger e⁄ects on demand.1 Kelly Gallagher and Erich Muehlegger
(2008) show that more salient sales tax waivers given at the time of purchase have seven
times as large an e⁄ect on hybrid vehicle purchases as income tax credits of an equivalent
amount. Chetty and Emmanuel Saez (2009) show using a ￿eld experiment that providing
simple information about the marginal incentive structure of the Earned Income Tax Credit
leads to signi￿cant changes in subsequent labor supply and earnings behavior. In Xavier
Gabaix and David I. Laibson￿ s (2006) terminology, these studies show that many tax policies
are ￿shrouded attributes.￿ Such inattention and imperfect optimization may be prevalent
in the case of taxation because tax systems are complex and nontransparent. Income tax
schedules are highly nonlinear, bene￿t-tax linkages for social insurance programs are opaque
(e.g. social security taxes and bene￿ts), and taxes on commodities are often not displayed
in posted prices (sales taxes, hotel city taxes, vehicle excise fees).
Motivated by this empirical evidence, this paper analyzes the implications of salience
e⁄ects and other optimization errors for the welfare consequences of tax policy. The challenge
1I use ￿tax salience￿to refer to the visibility of the tax inclusive price. When taxes are included in the
posted price, the total tax-inclusive price is more visible but the tax rate itself may be less clear. There
is a longstanding theoretical literature on ￿￿scal illusion￿which discusses how the lack of visibility of tax
rates may a⁄ect voting behavior and the size of government (John S. Mill 1848). Unlike that literature, I
de￿ne salience in terms of the visibility of the tax inclusive price because I focus on behaviors that optimally
depend on total tax inclusive prices rather than behaviors which depend on the tax rate itself.
1in this analysis ￿ as in behavioral public economics more generally ￿ is the calculation
of welfare when behavior is inconsistent with full optimization (B. Douglas Bernheim and
Antonio Rangel 2009, Jerry R. Green and Daniel Hojman 2009). One approach to this
problem is to specify a positive model for why agents deviate from full optimization and
analyze welfare costs within that model. This is the approach taken by Chetty, Looney, and
Kroft (2007), who derive formulas for the incidence and e¢ ciency costs of taxes in a bounded
rationality model of tax salience. Although useful in obtaining some insights into welfare
implications, this approach has the shortcoming of relying on particular assumptions about
what drives deviations from full optimization. Bounded rationality is not the only model of
inattention; models of forgetfulness or cue theories of attention could also generate salience
e⁄ects, and could potentially lead to di⁄erent welfare implications.
In this paper, I develop an alternative method of characterizing the welfare consequences
of taxation when agents optimize imperfectly that does not rely on a speci￿c positive model
of behavior. The approach rests upon two general assumptions: (1) tax policies a⁄ect
welfare only through their e⁄ects on the consumption bundle chosen by the agent and (2)
consumption choices when prices are fully salient ￿e.g., when there are no taxes ￿are consis-
tent with full optimization. Under these assumptions, I derive formulas for the incidence and
e¢ ciency costs of taxation that depend only on the empirically observed demand function
and not on the underlying model which generates that demand function. Intuitively, there
are two demand curves that together are su¢ cient statistics for welfare calculations when in-
dividuals make optimization errors: the tax-demand curve, which tells us how demand varies
with taxes that are not included in posted prices, and the price-demand curve, which tells
us how demand varies as (fully salient) posted prices change. I use the tax-demand curve to
determine the e⁄ect of the tax on behavior and then use the price-demand curve to calculate
the e⁄ect of that change in behavior on welfare. The price-demand curve can be used to
recover the agent￿ s underlying preferences and calculate welfare because it is generated by
optimizing behavior.
The bene￿ts of this approach to welfare analysis are its simplicity and adaptability. The
formulas for excess burden and incidence can be derived using supply and demand diagrams
and familiar notions of consumer and producer surplus. The formulas di⁄er from the stan-
2dard Harberger (1964) expressions by a single factor ￿the ratio of the compensated tax
elasticity to the compensated price elasticity. Thus, one can calculate the (partial equilib-
rium) deadweight cost and incidence of any tax policy by estimating both the tax and price
elasticities instead of just the tax elasticity as in the existing empirical literature. Although
the welfare analysis is motivated by evidence of salience e⁄ects, the formulas account for all
errors that consumers may make when optimizing with respect to taxes.2 For example, con-
fusion between average and marginal income tax rates (Charles de Bartolome 1995, Je⁄rey
B. Liebman and Richard J. Zeckhauser 2004, Naomi E. Feldman and Peter Katu￿ ￿ cÆk 2006)
or over perception of estate tax rates (Robert J. Blendon, et al. 2003, Joel B. Slemrod 2006)
can be handled using exactly the same formulas, without requiring knowledge of individuals￿
tax perceptions and information set.3
In addition to providing quantitative guidance about welfare consequences, the formulas
derived here challenge widely held qualitative intuitions based on the full optimization model.
First, the agent who bears the statutory incidence of a tax bears more of the economic
incidence, violating the classic tax neutrality result in competitive markets. Second, a tax
increase on a normal good can have a substantial e¢ ciency cost even when demand for
the good does not change by distorting budget allocations. Finally, holding ￿xed the tax
elasticity of demand, an increase in the price elasticity of demand reduces deadweight loss
and increases incidence on consumers.
The approach to welfare analysis in this paper can be viewed as an application of Bern-
heim and Rangel￿ s (2009) choice-based approach, in which the choices when taxes are salient
reveal an agent￿ s true rankings. It is also an example of the recent su¢ cient statistic
approach in public economics, in which welfare implications are derived from high-level elas-
ticities rather than structural primitives (Chetty 2009).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I sets up a simple model
2The formulas do not, however, permit errors in optimization relative to salient prices. Such errors can be
accommodated by isolating a condition where the true price elasticity is revealed and applying the formulas
here.
3Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004) analyze optimal income taxation in a model where individuals misper-
ceive tax schedules because of ￿ironing￿or ￿spotlighting￿behavior. The approach proposed in the present
paper does not require assumptions about whether individuals iron, spotlight, or respond in some other
way to the tax schedule, as any of these behaviors are captured in the empirically observed tax and wage
elasticities of labor supply.
3of demand with salience e⁄ects. Section II characterizes tax incidence in this model. Sec-
tion III characterizes e¢ ciency costs, which is a more complex problem because additional
assumptions are required to calculate welfare changes when agents optimize imperfectly.
Section IV concludes.
I Setup
Consider an economy with two goods, x and y. The government levies two speci￿c (unit)
taxes on good x: an ￿excise￿tax tE that is included in the posted price and a ￿sales￿tax
tS that is not included in the posted price.4 The only distinction between the two taxes
is their salience: the excise tax is perfectly salient because the excise-tax-inclusive price is
visible, whereas the sales tax is not fully salient. I use the excise and sales tax terminology
to match commodity taxes, but the formulas below can be applied to any tax, including
labor and capital income taxes.
Let t = tE + tS denote the total tax on good x. Good y, the numeraire, is untaxed.
Let p denote the pretax price of x and q = p + t denote the tax-inclusive price of x. As is
standard in partial equilibrium analyses, assume that the tax revenue is not spent on the
taxed good (i.e. it is used to buy y or thrown away).5 The tools developed below can be
adapted to analyze Pigouvian taxes intended to correct behavior, but I defer that analysis
to future work.
Consumption. The representative consumer has wealth Z and has utility u(x) + v(y).
In the benchmark full-optimization model, the agent chooses a consumption bundle (x￿(p+
tE;tS;Z);y￿(p + tE;tS;Z)) that satis￿es
u
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4I analyze speci￿c rather than ad valorem (percentage of price) taxes to simplify the algebra. The
incidence and excess burden of introducing an ad valorem tax ￿S when there are no pre-existing taxes can
be calculated by replacing tS by ￿S and @x
@tS by @x
@￿S in the derivative-based formulas in Propositions 1-3.
5The welfare analysis focuses solely on the costs of raising tax revenue, taking the bene￿ts of a given
amount of revenue as invariant to the tax system used to generate it. For example, I ignore the possibility
that more visible taxes may constrain ine¢ cient spending by politicians (Amy N. Finkelstein 2007).
4This model implies @x￿
@p = @x￿
@t , contradicting the empirical evidence described in the intro-
duction. To allow for di⁄erent responses to prices and taxes, let x(p + tE;tS;Z) denote the
empirically observed demand for x as a function of the posted price, sales tax, and wealth
and y(p+tE;tS;Z) the corresponding demand function for y. I do not place structure on the
positive model that generates (x(p + tE;tS;Z);y(p + tE;tS;Z)) other than to assume that
the demand functions are smooth and that the choices are feasible:
(p + t)x(p + t
E;t
S;Z) + y(p + t
E;t
S;Z) = Z









where "x;qjtS = ￿ @x
@tS
q
x(p+tE;tS;Z) measures the percentage change in demand caused by a 1 per-




represents the analogous measure for a 1 percent increase in q through a change in p. When
discussing the intuition for the results below, I will focus on the case where ￿ < 1 and inter-
pret ￿ as a measure of the degree of inattention to the tax. However, the analysis permits
￿ > 1 and more generally permits @x
@t to di⁄er from @x
@p for any reason, not just inattention.6
The formulas derived below therefore account for any errors that consumers may make when
optimizing with respect to taxes.
Production. Assume that the supply of the numeraire good y is perfectly elastic. This
assumption shuts down general equilibrium e⁄ects by ensuring that the price of y is una⁄ected
by the tax on x. Good x is produced by price-taking ￿rms, which use c(S) units of y to
produce S units of x. The marginal cost of production is weakly increasing: c0(S) > 0 and
c00(S) ￿ 0. Let ￿(S) = pS ￿ c(S) denote the representative ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts at a given pretax
price p and level of supply S. Assuming that ￿rms optimize perfectly, the supply function
for good x is implicitly de￿ned by the ￿rst-order condition for S in the pro￿t-maximization
6Although the empirical studies described above ￿nd that ￿ < 1, this need not be the case for all taxes.
The opaque estate tax system, for example, appears to cause many individuals to over-perceive tax rates on
wealth (Slemrod 2006).
5problem: p = c0(S(p)).7 Let "S;p = @S
@p
p
S(p) denote the price elasticity of supply.
II Incidence
How is the burden of a tax shared between consumers and producers in competitive equi-
librium when consumers optimize imperfectly with respect to taxes? I derive formulas for
the incidence of the sales tax on producers and consumers which parallel the derivations of
Laurence J. Kotliko⁄and Lawrence H. Summers (1987) for the full-optimization case. As is
standard in the literature on tax incidence, I use D(p;tS;Z) instead of x(p;tS;Z) to refer to
the demand curve in this subsection. Let p = p(tE;tS) denote the equilibrium pretax price




S;Z) = S(p) (1)
Implicit di⁄erentiation of (1) yields the following results.














and the incidence on consumers is
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p"S;p + (1 ￿ ￿)"D;qjp
q
p"S;p + "D;qjp
where @D=@tS and @D=@p are both evaluated at (p + tE;tS;Z) and @S=@p is evaluated at p.
Figure 1 illustrates the incidence of introducing a sales tax tS in a market that is initially
untaxed. The ￿gure plots supply and demand as a function of the pretax price p. The
market initially clears at a price p0 = p(0;0). When the tax is levied, the demand curve
7The literature in psychology and economics has argued that ￿rms are less prone to systematic errors
than consumers (see e.g. section IV of DellaVigna 2007). It would be straightforward to extend the analysis
to allow for salience e⁄ects on the ￿rm side as well, in which case the formulas will depend on @S
@p and @S
@tS.
6shifts inward by tS@D=@tS units, creating an excess supply of E = tS@D=@tS units of the
good at the initial price p0. To re-equilibrate the market, producers cut the pretax price by
E=(@S=@p￿@D=@p) units. The only di⁄erence in the incidence diagram in Figure 1 relative
to the traditional model without salience e⁄ects is that the demand curve shifts inward
by tS@D=@tS instead of tS@D=@p. With salience e⁄ects, the shift in the demand curve is
determined by the tax elasticity, while the price adjustment needed to clear the market is
determined by the price elasticity. This is why one must estimate both the tax and price
elasticities to calculate incidence.
Three general lessons about tax incidence emerge from the formulas in Proposition 1.
1. [Attenuated Incidence on Producers] Incidence on producers is attenuated by ￿ =
@D=@tS
@D=@p relative to the traditional model. Intuitively, producers face less pressure to reduce
the pretax price when consumers under react to the sales tax. In the extreme case where
@D=@tS = 0, consumers bear all of the tax, because there is no need to change the pretax
price to clear the market. More generally, the incidence of a tax on consumers is inversely
related to the degree of attention to the tax (￿).
One interpretation of this result is that the demand curve becomes more inelastic when
individuals are inattentive. Though changes in inattention and the price elasticity both
a⁄ect the gross-of-tax-elasticity "D;qjtS = ￿"D;qjp in the same way, their e⁄ects on incidence
are not equivalent. To see this, consider two markets, A and B, where "A
S;p = "B
S;p = 0:1.
In market A, demand is inelastic and consumers are fully attentive to taxes: "A
D;qjp = 0:3
and ￿
A = 1. In market B, demand is elastic but consumers are inattentive: "B
D;qjp = 1
and ￿
B = 0:3. An econometrician would estimate the same tax elasticity in both markets:
"A
D;qjtS = "B
D;qjtS = 0:3. However, [
dp
dtS]A = ￿0:75 whereas [
dp
dtS]B = ￿0:27. In market A,
suppliers bear most of the incidence since demand is 3 times more elastic to price than
supply. In market B, even though demand is 10 times as price elastic as supply, producers
are able to shift most of the incidence of the tax to consumers because of inattention.
Intuitively, a low price elasticity of demand has two e⁄ects on incidence: it reduces the
shift in the demand curve but increases the size of the price cut needed to re-equilibrate the
market for a given level of excess supply. Inattention to the tax also reduces the shift in the
demand curve, but does not have the second o⁄setting e⁄ect. This di⁄erence is apparent
7in the formula for
dp
dt in (2), where "D;qjp appears in both the numerator and denominator
whereas ￿ appears only in the numerator. As a result, a 1 percent reduction in attention
leads to greater incidence on consumers than a 1 percent reduction in the price elasticity.
As "S;p approaches 0,
dq
dtS approaches 1￿￿ irrespective of "D;qjp. If consumers are su¢ ciently
inattentive, they bear most of the incidence of a tax even if supply is inelastic.
2. [No Tax Neutrality] Taxes that are included in posted prices have greater incidence






dtS. Taxes levied on
producers are more likely to be included in posted prices than taxes levied on consumers
because producers must actively ￿shroud￿a tax levied on them in order to reduce its salience.
Together, these observations suggest that producers will generally bear more of the incidence
when a tax is levied on them than when it is levied on the consumers. Statutory incidence
a⁄ects economic incidence, contrary to intuition based on the full-optimization model.8
3. [E⁄ect of Price Elasticity] Holding ￿xed the size of the tax elasticity "D;qjtS, an increase
in the price elasticity of demand raises incidence on consumers (@[
dp
dtS]=@"D;qjp > 0). This is
because holding ￿xed the shift in the demand curve created by the introduction of the tax,
a smaller price reduction is needed to clear the market if demand is very price elastic. In
contrast, if the degree of inattention ￿ is held ￿xed as "D;qjp varies, one obtains the conven-
tional result @[
dp
dtS]=@"D;qjp < 0 because "D;qjtS and "D;qjp vary at the same rate. Thus, taxing
markets with more elastic demand could lead to greater or lesser incidence on consumers,
depending on the extent to which the tax elasticity "D;qjtS covaries with the price elasticity
"D;qjp.
III E¢ ciency Cost
I begin by characterizing the excess burden of introducing a sales tax tS in an initially
untaxed market with constant-returns-to-scale production (￿xed producer prices). I then
8Consistent with this prediction, Busse, Silva-Risso, and Zettelmeyer (2006) ￿nd that 35 percent of
manufacturer rebates given to car dealers are passed through to the buyer, while 85 percent of rebates given
to buyers stay with the buyer. The reason is that most consumers did not ￿nd out about the dealer rebates.
Rudolf Kerschbamer and Georg Kirchsteiger (2000) ￿nd that statutory evidence a⁄ects economic incidence
in a lab experiment.
8extend the analysis to allow for endogenous producer prices and pre existing excise and sales
taxes.
III.A De￿nitions
I ￿rst de￿ne generalized indirect utility and expenditure functions that permit prices and
taxes to have di⁄erent e⁄ects. Let V (p+tE;tS;Z) = u(x(p+tE;tS;Z))+v(y(p+tE;tS;Z))
denote the agent￿ s indirect utility as a function of the posted price of good x, the sales tax,
and wealth. Let e(p + tE;tS;V ) denote the agent￿ s expenditure function, which represents
the minimum wealth necessary to attain utility V at a given posted price and sales tax. Let
R(tE;tS;Z) = tx(p + tE;tS;Z) denote tax revenue.
Following Herbert Mohring (1971) and Alan J. Auerbach (1985), I measure excess burden
using the concept of equivalent variation. When p is ￿xed, the excess burden of introducing
a sales tax tS in a previously untaxed market is
EB(t
S) = Z ￿ e(p;0;V (p;t
S;Z)) ￿ R(0;t
S;Z) (3)
The value EB(tS) is the amount of additional tax revenue that could be collected from
the consumer while keeping his utility constant if the distortionary tax were replaced with
a lump-sum tax. Roughly speaking, EB(tS) can be interpreted as the total value of the
purchases that fail to occur because of the tax. The objective is to derive approximate
expressions for (3) in terms of empirically estimable elasticities.
III.B Preference Recovery
The e¢ ciency cost of a tax policy depends on two elements: (1) the change in behavior
induced by the tax and (2) the e⁄ect of that change in behavior on the consumer￿ s utility. The
￿rst element is observed empirically ￿one can estimate the demand function x(p+tE;tS;Z).
The second element is the key challenge for behavioral welfare economics. How does one
compute indirect utility V (p + tE;tS;Z) when the agent￿ s behavior is not consistent with
optimization? The following two assumptions allow us to recover V without specifying a
positive model for the demand function x(p + tE;tS;Z).
9A1 Taxes a⁄ect utility only through their e⁄ects on the chosen consumption bundle. The
agent￿ s indirect utility given taxes of (tE;tS) is
V (p + t
E;t
S;Z) = u(x(p + t
E;t
S;Z)) + v(y(p + t
E;t
S;Z))
A2 When tax-inclusive prices are fully salient, the agent chooses the same allocation as a
fully-optimizing agent:
x(p;0;Z) = x
￿(p;0;Z) = argmaxu(x(p;0;Z)) + v(Z ￿ px(p;0;Z))
Assumption A1 requires that consumption is a su¢ cient statistic for utility ￿that is,
holding ￿xed the consumption bundle (x;y), the tax rate or its salience has no e⁄ect on V:
To understand the content of this assumption, consider the following situation in which it is
violated. In a bounded rationality model, the cognitive cost that the agent pays to calculate
the total price when tS > 0 makes his utility lower than pure consumption utility. Taxes
that are not included in posted prices therefore generate deadweight burden beyond that
due to the distortion in the consumption bundle (Chetty, Looney, and Kroft 2007). In such
models, the excess burden computations in this paper correspond to the deadweight cost net
of any increase in cognitive costs.9
Assumption A2 requires that the agent behaves like a fully-optimizing agent when all
taxes are fully salient. That is, the agent￿ s choices when total prices are fully salient reveal
his true rankings. This assumption is violated when the agent￿ s choices are suboptimal
even without taxes. For example, if there are other ￿shrouded attributes￿or if agents su⁄er
from biases when optimizing relative to prices (Nina Mazar, Botond Koszegi, and Dan Ariely
2008), one would not directly recover true preferences from x(p;0;Z). The excess burden
formulas derived below ignore errors in optimization relative to prices.
Using assumptions A1 and A2, I calculate consumer welfare and excess burden in two
steps. I ￿rst use the demand function without taxes x(p;0;Z) to recover the agent￿ s un-
derlying preferences (u(x);v(y)) as in the full-optimization model. I then use the demand
9Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2007) show that the additional deadweight burden due to cognitive costs is
likely to be negligible since relatively small cognitive costs generate substantial amounts of inattention.
10function with taxes x(p+tE;tS;Z) to calculate the agent￿ s indirect utility V (p+tE;tS;Z) as
a function of the tax rate. Conceptually, this method pairs the libertarian criterion of calcu-
lating welfare from individual choice with the assumption that the agent optimizes relative
to true incentives only when tax-inclusive prices are perfectly salient.
This calculation of excess burden can be viewed as an application of Bernheim and
Rangel￿ s (2009) choice-based approach to welfare analysis. Bernheim and Rangel show that
one can obtain bounds on welfare without specifying a positive theory of behavior by sepa-
rating the inputs that matter for utility from ￿ancillary conditions￿that do not. By applying
a ￿re￿nement￿to identify ancillary conditions under which an agent￿ s choices reveal his true
rankings, one can sharpen the bounds. In Bernheim and Rangel￿ s terminology, assumption
A1 is that tax salience is an ￿ancillary condition￿that a⁄ects choices but not true utility.
Assumption A2 is a ￿re￿nement￿which posits that the choices made when the tax is not
perfectly salient are ￿suspect,￿and should be discarded when inferring the utility relevant for
welfare analysis. This re￿nement allows us to obtain exact measures of equivalent variation
and e¢ ciency costs without placing structure on the model that generates x(p + tE;tS;Z).
III.C Fixed Producer Prices
I derive analytical formulas for excess burden using approximations analogous to those used
by Harberger (1964) and Edgar K. Browning (1987). Like the widely applied Harberger-
Browning formula, the formulas below ignore the third- and higher-order terms in the Taylor
expansion for excess-burden. Hence, the formulas provide accurate measures of excess
burden for small tax changes.
In this section, I characterize excess burden of introducing a sales tax in a market where
production is constant-returns-to-scale (c00 = 0). In this case, the pretax price of x is ￿xed at
p = c0(0) because the supply curve is ￿ at. Moreover, since ￿rms earns zero pro￿ts (￿ = 0),
only consumer welfare matters for excess burden. To state the formula compactly, let us
introduce the following notation for income-compensated elasticities. Let @xc=@p = @x=@p+
x@x=@Z denote the income-compensated (Hicksian) price e⁄ect. De￿ne @xc=@tS = @x=@tS+
x@x=@Z as the analogous income-compensated tax e⁄ect. Note that this ￿compensated tax
e⁄ect￿does not necessarily satisfy the Slutsky condition @xc=@tS < 0. It is possible to have
11an upward-sloping compensated tax-demand curve because x(p;tS;Z) is not generated by
utility maximization. In contrast, assumption A2 guarantees @xc









x denote the compensated price and tax
elasticities.
Proposition 2 Suppose producer prices are ￿xed ("s;p = 1). Under assumptions A1-A2,






























is the ratio of
the compensated tax and price e⁄ects.
Proof. Here, I provide an instructive proof for the case without income e⁄ects ( @x
@Z = 0),
which implies that utility is quasilinear (v(y) = y). The derivation for the general case is
given in Appendix A. To reduce notation, I suppress wealth and write x(p;tS).
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0(x) ￿ (p + t
S)]dx (5)



















[P(x) ￿ p]dx (6)
which measures the area under the inverse-demand curve between x(p;0) and x(p;tS). This
is an exact formula for excess burden that could be implemented with a non-parametric
estimate of the demand curve. A simple analytical formula can be obtained by approximat-
ing EB(tS) using a Taylor expansion. I ignore the (tS)3 and higher-order terms, which is
equivalent to assuming that x(￿) is linear when utility is quasilinear. Evaluating the integral











which corresponds to (4) because compensated and uncompensated elasticities are equal
when @x=@Z = 0.
Graphical Derivation. Figure 2 illustrates the calculation of deadweight loss for the case
without income e⁄ects. The initial price of the good is p0 and the price after the imposition
of the sales tax is p0 + tS. The ￿gure plots two demand curves. The ￿rst is the standard
Marshallian demand curve as a function of the total price of the good, x(p;0). This price-
demand curve coincides with the marginal utility u0(x) as shown in the proof above. The
second, x(p0;tS) represents how demand varies with the tax on x. This tax-demand curve is
drawn assuming @x=@p ￿ @x=@tS, consistent with the empirical evidence.
The agent￿ s initial consumption choice prior to the introduction of the tax is depicted
by x0 = x(p0;0). Initial consumer surplus is given by triangle ABC, which equals total
utility (up to a constant) as shown by (5). When the tax tS is introduced, the agent cuts
consumption of x by ￿x = ￿tS@x=@tS. Notice that at the new consumption choice x1,
the agent￿ s marginal willingness-to-pay for x is below the total price p0 + tS because he
under-reacts to the tax. This optimization error leads to a loss of surplus corresponding
to triangle DEF. The consumer￿ s surplus after the implementation of the tax is therefore
given by triangle DGC minus triangle DEF. The revenue raised from the tax corresponds
13to the rectangle GBEH: It follows that the change in total surplus ￿government revenue
plus consumer surplus ￿equals the shaded triangle AFH. This is precisely the measure in
(6) ￿the area under the price-demand curve between x0 and x1. The base of the triangle
(AH) has length ￿tS @x
@tS while the height of the triangle (AF) is tS @x=@tS
@x=@p , yielding (7).10
When there are income e⁄ects ( @x
@Z > 0), the form of the formula remains exactly the same,
but all the inputs are replaced by income-compensated e⁄ects, exactly as in the Harberger
formula. The intuition for this di⁄erence is analogous to that in the full-optimization model:
behavioral responses due to pure income e⁄ects are non-distortionary, since they would occur
under lump sum taxation as well. Deadweight loss is determined by di⁄erence between the
actual behavioral response ( @x
@tS) and the socially optimal response given the reduction in
net-of-tax income (￿x @x
@Z), which is @x
@tS ￿ (￿x @x
@Z) = @xc
@tS.11
Note that in Proposition 2 and all subsequent excess burden calculations, @xc=@p is eval-
uated at a point with zero sales tax (p;0). The reason is that one recovers true preferences
only when the posted price equals the total price: x(p;tS;Z) = x￿(p;tS;Z) if and only if
tS = 0. If an environment without sales tax is not observed, one could implement the
formula by assuming that the price elasticity does not depend on the tax rate ( d2xc
dpdtS = 0), a
plausible assumption for small tax rates. Under this assumption, dxc
dp (p;0;Z) = dxc
dp (p;tS;Z),
which can be estimated empirically as in Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2007).
Discussion. The only di⁄erence between (4) and the canonical Harberger formula (EB￿(tS) =
￿1
2(tS)2 @xc
@tS) is the ratio of the tax and price e⁄ects
@xc=@tS
@xc=@p . Three general lessons about excess
burden emerge from this ratio.
1. [Inattention Reduces Excess Burden if @x
@Z = 0] When there are no income e⁄ects, the
tax tS generates deadweight cost equivalent to that created by a perfectly salient tax of ￿tS.
If agents ignore taxes completely and ￿ = 0, then EB = 0. Taxation creates no ine¢ ciency
when ￿ = 0 because the agent￿ s consumption allocation coincides with the ￿rst-best bundle
10Another instructive derivation starts from the excess burden of taxation for a fully-optimizing agent,
EB￿ (triangle AID). Starting from EB￿, I obtain excess burden for the agent who does not optimize
fully (triangle AFH) by making two adjustments: (1) subtracting the additional revenue earned by the
government because the agent under-reacts to the tax (rectangle HIDE) and (2) adding the private welfare
loss due to the optimization error (triangle FED).
11Income e⁄ects have more complex e⁄ects on the excess burden calculation when there are more than
two goods because the tax may create a suboptimal budget allocation among the untaxed goods.
14that he would have chosen under lump sum taxation.12 As the degree of attention to taxes
rises, excess burden rises at a quadratic rate: EB / ￿
2. Excess burden rises with the square
of ￿ for the same reason that it rises with the square of the tS ￿the increasing marginal
social cost of deviating from the ￿rst-best. Because EB is a quadratic function of ￿ but a
linear function of "x;qjp, inattention (reductions in ￿) and inelasticity (reductions in "x;qjp)
have di⁄erent e⁄ects on excess burden, as in the incidence analysis. Like incidence, excess
burden depends on which side of the market is taxed. Since a tax on producers is likely to
be included in posted prices, it leads to a larger reduction in demand and more deadweight
loss than an equivalent tax levied on consumers when @x
@Z = 0.
2. [Inattention Can Raise Excess Burden if @x
@Z > 0] When there are income e⁄ects,
making a tax less salient to reduce @x
@tS can increase deadweight loss. In fact, a tax can
create deadweight cost even if the agent completely ignores it and demand for the taxed
good does not change, i.e. @x
@tS = 0. This result contrasts with the canonical intuition
that taxes generate deadweight costs only if they induce changes in demand. In the full-
optimization model, taxation of a normal good creates a deadweight cost only if @x
@p < 0
since @x
@p = 0 ) @xc
@p = 0 given @x
@Z > 0. This reasoning fails when the tax-demand is not
the outcome of perfect optimization, because there is no Slutsky condition for @xc
@tS. A zero
uncompensated tax elasticity does not imply that the compensated tax elasticity is zero.
Instead, when @x
@tS = 0, @xc
@tS = @x










This equation shows that EB > 0 even when @x=@tS = 0 in the presence of income e⁄ects.
To understand this result, recall that the excess burden of a distortionary tax is determined
by the extent to which the agent deviates from the allocation he would optimally choose
if subject to a lump sum tax of an equivalent amount. In the quasilinear case, the agent￿ s
consumption bundle when ignoring the tax coincides with the bundle he would optimally
12The consumer￿ s private welfare always rises with ￿ ￿increased salience of tax-inclusive prices is always
desirable from the consumer￿ s perspective. However, the gain in the consumer￿ s private welfare from full
attention (triangle FED in Figure 4) is more than o⁄set by the resulting loss in government revenue (rectangle
HIDE), which is why total surplus falls with ￿ when @x
@Z = 0.
15choose under lump sum taxation, because the socially optimal choice of x does not depend on
total income. When utility is not quasilinear, an optimizing agent would reduce consumption
of both x and y when faced with a lump sum tax. An agent who does not change his
demand for x at all when the tax is introduced ends up over-consuming x relative to the
social optimum. The income-compensated tax elasticity @xc
@tS = @x
@Z is positive because the
tax e⁄ectively distorts demand for x upward once the income e⁄ect is taken into account,
leading to ine¢ ciency.
As a concrete example, consider an individual who consumes cars (x) and food (y).
Suppose he chooses the same car he would have bought at a total price of p0 because he
does not perceive the tax ( @x
@tS = 0) and therefore has to cut back on food to meet his
budget. This ine¢ cient allocation of net-of-tax income leads to a loss in surplus. The lost
surplus is proportional to the income e⁄ect on cars @x
@Z because this elasticity determines
how much the agent should have cut spending on the car to reach the social optimum given
the tax. This example illustrates that policies which ￿hide￿taxes can potentially create
substantial deadweight loss despite attenuating behavioral responses, particularly when the
income elasticity and expenditure on the taxed good are large.
Note that inattention to a tax on x need not necessarily lead to @x
@tS = 0. The e⁄ect of
inattention on @x
@tS depends on how the agent meets his budget given the tax. The agent
must reduce consumption of at least one of the goods to meet his budget when the tax on
x is introduced: @x
@tS +
@y
@tS = ￿x. The way in which agents meet their budget may vary
across individuals (Chetty, Looney, and Kroft 2007). For example, credit-constrained agents
may be forced to cut back on consumption of y if they ignore the tax when buying x, as
in the car purchase example above, leading to @x
@tS = ￿ = 0 and EB > 0. Agents who
smooth intertemporally, in contrast, may cut both y as well as future purchases of x (buying
a cheaper car next time). Such intertemporal smoothing could lead to a long-run allocation
closer to the socially optimal @x
@tS = ￿x @x
@Z, in which case hidden taxes would lead to ￿
c = 0
and EB = 0. Importantly, Proposition 2 holds irrespective of how the agent meets his
budget. Variations in the budget adjustment process are captured in the value of @xc
@tS.
3. [Role of Price Elasticity] Holding ￿xed "x;qjtS, excess burden is inversely related to
"x;qjp. As demand becomes less price-elastic, EB increases. This can be seen in Figure 2,
16where the shaded triangle becomes larger as x(p;0) becomes steeper, holding x(p0;tS) ￿xed.
Intuitively, an agent with price-inelastic consumption has rapidly increasing marginal utility
as his consumption level deviates from the ￿rst-best level. A given reduction in demand thus
leads to a larger loss of surplus for an agent with more price-inelastic demand. As in the
incidence analysis, taxing markets with more elastic demand could lead to greater or lesser
excess burden, depending on the covariance between "x;qjtS and "x;qjp.
III.D Endogenous Producer Prices
I now drop the constant-returns-to-scale assumption and consider a market where the supply
curve is upward sloping ("S;p < 1). In this case, pretax prices are endogenous to the tax
rate and ￿rms earn positive pro￿ts, which must be accounted for in the welfare calculation.
Following Auerbach (1985), assume that pro￿ts ￿(S(p)) are paid to the consumer using the
numeraire y. In this subsection, I assume that utility is quasilinear (v(y) = y). I do not




@Z = 0, excess burden is
EB(t
S) = Z ￿ e(p0;0;V (p1;t
S;Z)) + ￿0 ￿ ￿1 ￿ R
where p0 = p(0;0) and p1 = p(0;tS) denote the equilibrium price before and after the
introduction of the tax, ￿i = ￿(S(pi)), and R = tSx(p1;tS) denotes tax revenue (Auerbach
1985). Intuitively, excess burden equals the sum of the change in consumer surplus and
producer surplus minus government revenue (R). Let dx
dtS denote the total reduction in






@tS. Correspondingly, let "TOT
x;qjtS = ￿ dx
dtS
q
x(p;tS) denote the total change in
demand caused by a 1 percent increase in the price q = p1 + tS through an increase in tS,
taking into account the e⁄ect of the endogenous price response.
Proposition 3 Suppose utility is quasilinear (v(y) = y). Under assumptions A1-A2, the
13Even in the full-optimization model, analytical formulas for excess burden cannot be obtained when
there are income e⁄ects and non-zero producer surplus (Auerbach 1985).


























Proof. The equation can be derived heuristically by calculating the area of the triangle that
lies between the supply and the (no tax) price-demand curve x(p;0) between the initial and
￿nal equilibrium quantities in Figure 1. The width of the triangle is tS dx
dtS and the height is
￿tS. See Appendix A for a formal derivation.
The lessons discussed above with ￿xed producer prices carry over to the case with en-
dogenous prices. Indeed, the formula for excess burden with upward-sloping supply has
exactly the same form as in (4). The only di⁄erence is that the size of the deviation in
demand from the social optimum is given by the total derivative dx
dtS instead of the partial
derivative @x
@tS. When p is ￿xed, these two derivatives coincide, so (8) collapses to the for-
mula in Proposition 2 without income e⁄ects. When p is endogenous, part of the distortion
in behavior is o⁄set by the reduction in prices by producers to clear the market, leading to
j dx
dtSj < j @x
@tSj and smaller deadweight loss.
III.E Preexisting Taxes
Finally, I calculate the marginal deadweight cost of increasing the sales tax by ￿t when there
are preexisting taxes on good x. The initial excise tax rate is tE




0) denote the initial pre-tax equilibrium price, q0 = p0+tE
0 +tS
0 denote the initial
tax-inclusive price, and x0 = x(p0 + tE
0 ;tS
0) denote initial quantity sold. Let pE
0 = p(tE
0 ;0)
denote the price when there is only an excise tax and p1 = p(tE
0 ;tS
0 + ￿t) denote the price
after the tax increase. The following proposition provides approximate formulas for excess
burden that are accurate for small initial tax rates (tE
0 ;tS
0) and a small tax increase ￿t. I
explain why the approximation requires small initial tax rates after stating the result, and
provide a formal statement of this requirement in Appendix A.
18Proposition 4 Under assumptions A1-A2, the excess burden of a small sales tax increase
￿t starting from small initial tax rates (tE
0 ;tS
0) is approximately given by the following for-
mulas, with all derivatives evaluated at the no-sales-tax equilibrium (pE
0 + tE
0 ;0).









































































Proof. See Appendix A and Appendix Figure 1.
The ￿rst term in these formulas, proportional to (￿t)2, is analogous to the triangle in
the classic ￿Harberger trapezoid.￿ This term comes from the loss in consumer and producer
surplus due to the tax increase, and is exactly the same as in the case without preexisting
taxes. The second term, proportional to ￿t, is analogous to the rectangle in the Harberger
trapezoid. This term re￿ ects the ￿scal externality that the agents impose on the government
by changing their behavior. Government revenue falls by ￿tdxc
dtS[tE
0 + tS
0] because of the
behavioral response to the tax increase. However, part of this ￿scal externality is o⁄set
by a gain of ￿tdxc
dtS[1 ￿ ￿
c]tS
0 in private utility to the consumer, since he was initially over
consuming x relative to his private optimum.
With preexisting taxes, tax increases can have a ￿rst-order (large) deadweight cost. The
￿rst-order deadweight cost due to tS
0 is multiplied by ￿
c because the deviation from the
socially optimal level of x caused by tS
0 is proportional to ￿
c. If utility is quasilinear, levy-
ing a tax on top of a preexisting tax tS
0 that is completely hidden (￿ = ￿
c = 0) generates
only second-order (small) excess burden. If utility is not quasilinear, the same tax increase
generates a ￿rst-order deadweight cost. Intuitively, the agent￿ s consumption bundle is dis-
19torted relative to the social optimum to begin with if dx
dtS = 0 when there are income e⁄ects.
An increase in the tax rate exacerbates this preexisting distortion, creating a ￿rst-order
deadweight cost even though there is no change in uncompensated demand.
I close with a technical remark about the approximations used in Proposition 4. The
classic ￿Harberger trapezoid￿formula requires that ￿t is small and that either (1) initial
tax rates are small or (2) demand is linear (d2x
dp2 = 0) over the ￿t interval (Auerbach 1985).
In the case studied here, for small ￿t, condition (1) su¢ ces to obtain simple formulas for
EB but (2) does not. The reason is that one can only recover the utility of x(p;tS) when
tS = 0 under A2. To calculate V (p;tS
0), I assume that tS
0 is small and take a Taylor
expansion around V ￿(p;tS
0), ignoring the third- and higher-order terms. Linearity over the
￿t interval itself does not allow us to calculate V (p;tS
0) when tS
0 > 0.14 Note that all of the
approximations in Propositions 2-4 are needed only to obtain simple analytical formulas for
EB. Exact measures of excess burden can be calculated using a non-parametric estimate of
x(p;t), as in the full-optimization model (Jerry A. Hausman and Whitney K. Newey 1995).
IV Conclusion
A growing body of evidence shows that individuals optimize imperfectly with respect to
many tax and transfer policies. The formulas developed in this paper can be applied to
characterize the incidence and e¢ ciency costs of such policies. Much as Harberger identi￿ed
the compensated price elasticity as the key parameter to be estimated in subsequent work,
the analysis here identi￿es the compensated tax and price elasticities ("c
x;qjtS and "c
x;qjp) as
￿su¢ cient statistics￿for welfare analysis in behavioral models of tax policy.
A natural next step would be to extend the welfare analysis in this paper to characterize
optimal taxation when agents optimize imperfectly, generalizing the results of Ramsey (1927)
and Mirrlees (1971). Combining the formulas here with a positive theory would be useful for
this analysis. For example, Chetty, Looney, and Kroft￿ s (2007) bounded-rationality model
predicts that attention and behavioral responses to taxation are larger when (1) tax rates
14Linearity of demand over the ￿t interval permits large tE
0 but not tS
0. To allow for large tS
0, one must





0) to calculate V (p0+ tE
0 ;tS
0).
20are high, (2) the price-elasticity of demand is large, and (3) the amount spent on the good
is large. Combined with the welfare analysis here, these predictions imply that in markets
with these three characteristics, tax incidence should fall more heavily on producers and
excess burden should be closer to the Harberger measure.
Finally, the approach to welfare analysis proposed here ￿using a domain where incen-
tives are fully salient to characterize the welfare consequences of policies that are not salient
￿can be applied in other contexts. Many social insurance programs (e.g. Medicare and
Social Security) have complex features and may induce suboptimal behaviors. By estimat-
ing behavioral responses to analogous programs whose incentives are more salient, one can
characterize the welfare consequences of the existing programs more accurately. Another
potential application is to optimal regulation, including consumer protection law and ￿nan-
cial market regulations. By identifying ￿suboptimal￿transactions using data on consumer￿ s
choices in domains where incentives are more salient, one could develop rules to maximize
consumer welfare that do not rely on paternalistic judgments.15
15For instance, the terms stated on the ￿rst page of a contract are likely to be more salient than those in
￿ne print or in later pages of a contract. By comparing how behavior responds to incentives stated on the
front page vs. other parts of the contract, one may be able to gauge the welfare losses of complexity and the
bene￿ts of regulation.
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23Appendix A: Proofs
Proposition 4 nests the results in Propositions 2 and 3 as the case where tE
0 = 0 and
tS
0 = 0. The proof of Proposition 4 below provides approximations for EB that are accurate





￿t = ￿￿t. I derive expressions for EB(￿tjtS
0;tE
0 ) using Taylor expansions that ignore
terms proportional to ￿






Proof of Proposition 4i
De￿nitions: Let xE
0 = x(p+tE
0 ;0), x0 = x(p+tE
0 ;tS









0 +￿tS;0). Let V ￿(p+tE
0 ;tS
0;Z) denote the utility attained by a
fully optimizing agent who consumes the optimal bundle (x￿(p+tE;tS;Z);y￿(p+tE;tS;Z)).
Let R￿(p + tE;tS;Z) = (tE + tS)x￿(p + tE;tS;Z) denote tax revenue obtained from a fully
optimizing agent.




















































￿ ￿ ￿R + G.






￿ ￿ ￿￿R + ￿G (9)




0 + ￿t) ￿ X(tE
0 ;tS
0). I will use Taylor
expansions to obtain simple expressions for each of these three terms below.




























24Ignoring the third- and higher-order terms (proportional to ￿




















iii) Simplifying the expression for G requires more work. First recall that the expenditure
function is
e(p;t
S;V ) = (p + t
S)x
c(p;t


















c s.t. u(x) + v(y) = V












The ￿rst-order condition for the EMP implies
u
0(x























where all the derivatives are evaluated at (p + tE
0 ;tS

























I show below that V ￿￿V is proportional to ￿
2; hence, the [V ￿￿V ]2 and higher-order terms
in this expansion can be ignored under the second-order approximation. Hence, one can
write
G =
[V ￿(p + tE
0 ;tS






De￿ne the utility gain from choosing the optimal level x￿ vs. another point x as
e G(x) = u(x





























v represent the third- and higher order terms of the Taylor expansions for
u and v. All of the terms in O3
u and +O3
v are ultimately proportional to ￿
n where n ￿ 3; so
25I ignore these terms from this point onward.
Using the ￿rst-order condition that characterizes the choice of the fully-optimizing agent,
u
0(x













￿ ￿ x) = (y ￿ y
￿)
one obtains





















































































































Finally, I use a result from Chetty (2006) which relates the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion
































26Note that @xc=@p = @x￿c=@p and @x=@p = @x￿=@p at the no-sales-tax point p + tE
0 under















































where the second approximation ignores third- and higher-order terms and all derivatives
are evaluated at (p + tE
0 ;0).
Combining the expressions for ￿G, ￿￿R, and ￿EB￿ above using (9) and collecting terms
yields the formula in Proposition 4ii.
Proof of Proposition 4ii
De￿nitions: Let pE
0 = p(tE;0), p0 = p(tE;tS), and p1 = p(tE;tS + ￿t). Let ￿0 and ￿1
denote pro￿ts before and after implementation of the tax. To reduce notation, I suppress




0 ;0), x0 = x(p0 + tE
0 ;tS
0), x1 = x(p1 + tE
0 ;tS
0 + ￿tS). Let
R0 = (tE
0 + tS
0)x0 and R1 = (tE
0 + tS
0 + ￿tS)x1.













0 +￿t;Z +￿1))+(￿0￿￿1)￿(R1￿R0) (14)
Using the de￿nition of the expenditure function for the quasilinear case and the de￿nition
of the pro￿t function, I write (14) as
EB = u(x0) ￿ u(x1) + c(x1) ￿ c(x0) (15)
This expression measures the area of the trapezoid that lies between the price-demand and
supply curves between x0 and x1, shown in Appendix Figure 1. The derivation below is
essentially an algebraic calculation of the area of that trapezoid using a series of Taylor
expansions. To begin, I write (15) as
EB = u





















n! (x1 ￿ x0)n; f = u;c consists of the third- and higher-order elements
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Note that the derivatives in these equations are evaluated at the no-sales-tax equilibrium
(pE
0 + tE
0 ;0) because this is the only point at which the ￿rst-order conditions hold.
Similarly, the ￿rst-order conditions from ￿rm optimization and a Taylor approximation
around xE
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E
0 ) + :::
Finally, a Taylor expansion around x0 yields:








Ignoring the third- and higher-order terms (proportional to ￿
n;n ￿ 3) in EB, I can combine


































To simplify this expression, I use the expression for
@p





















) = ￿ (17)
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NOTE–This figure illustrates the incidence of introducing a tax ts levied on consumers in a
market that is initially untaxed. The figure plots supply and demand as a function of the pre-tax
price p. The initial price-demand curve is Dp|tS  0; the price-demand curve after the tax is
introduced is Dp|tS. When the tax is levied, the demand curve shifts inward by tS  ∂D/∂tS
units, creating an excess supply of E  tS  ∂D/∂tS. To re-equilibriate the market, producers cut































NOTE–This figure illustrates the deadweight cost of introducing a tax ts levied on consumers
when ∂x
∂Z  0 and producer prices are fixed. The figure plots two demand curves: (1) the
price-demand curve xp,0, which shows how demand varies with the pre-tax price of the good
and (2) the tax-demand curve xp0,tS, which shows how demand varies with the tax. The
figure is drawn assuming |∂x/∂tS| ≤ |∂x/∂p|, consistent with existing empirical evidence. The tax
reduces demand from x0 to x1. The consumer’s surplus after the implementation of the tax is
given by triangle DGC minus triangle DEF. The revenue raised from the tax corresponds to the
rectangle GBEH. The change in total surplus – government revenue plus consumer surplus –
equals the shaded triangle AFH.Appendix Figure 1
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NOTE–This figure depicts the excess burden of increasing the sales tax by Δt starting from
initial tax rates of t0
E,t0
S when ∂x
∂Z  0 and prices are endogenous (Proposition 4ii). The figure
plots three Marshallian demand curves as a function of the pre-tax price: (1) xp,0 –t h e
price-demand curve absent taxes, which allows us to recover true preferences; (2) xp  t0
E,t0
S –
the initial demand curve prior to the tax increase; and (3) xp  t0
E Δ t,t0
S – the demand curve




E,0, which is the point from which the second-order approximations are made to
calculate the area of the trapezoid.